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By letter of 6 April 1990 the President of the Council consulted the European 
Parliament on the proposal from the Commission for a Council directive on 
prevention of use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
(OJ No.106, 28.4.1990, p. 6). 
On 14 May 1990, the European Parliament referred this proposal to the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights as the Committee responsable 
and to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Pol icy 
for its opinion. 
On 23 May 1990 the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights appointed 
Mr Geoffrey HOON rapporteur. 
The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights considered the proposal 
for a directive and the draft report at its meetings of 18/19 September 1990, 
15/16 October 1990 and 30/31 October 1990. 
At the last meeting, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 
adopted the draft legislative resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: STAUFFENBERG, chairman; ROTHLEY, vice-
chairman; HOON, rapporteur; ANASTASSOPOULOS, CABANILLAS GALLAS, COONEY, DE 
DONNEA (for DE GUCHT), ELLIOTT, FALCONER, FONTAINE, GARCIA AMIGO, GRUND, 
JANSSEN VAN RAAY, MALANGRE, MEBRAK-ZAIDI, SALEMA, SCHLECHTER, B. SIMPSON (for 
ODDY), VALENT, WIJSENBEEK (Rule 124.(4)) and ZAVVOS. 
The opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy is attached. 
The report was tabled with Sessional Services on 5 November 1990. 
The deadline for tabling amendments is 12 noon on Thursday, 15 November 1990. 
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A 
AMENDMENTS 
Commission proposal for a Council directive on prevention of use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
Commission text 1 
First Citation 
Having regard to the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic 
Community, and in particular Article 
57(2), third sentence, thereof, 
Amended text 
(Amendment No. 1) 
First Citation 
Having regard to the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic 
Community and in particular Article 
57 ( 2) first and third sentence, 
thereof, 
(Amendment No. 2) 
Sixth recital a (new) 
Whereas, in the international 
context, the free movement of 
capital may constitute a risk if 
third countries do not apply 
comparable standards; whereas 
therefore the Commission must 
monitor the situation in third 
countries and reveal the identity of 
those countries applying inadequate 
standards in order to draw the 
attention of credit and financial 
institutions in the Community to the 
risk of dealing in financial 
transactions with similar 
institutions from those countries; 
1 For full text see OJ No. C 106, 28.4. 1990, p. 6 
DOC_EN\RR\98402 - 4 - PE 141.357/fin. 
Or. EN 
Whereas preserving the financial 
system from money laundering is a 
task which cannot be carried out by 
the judicia 1 and 1 aw enforcement 
authorities without the cooperation 
of credit and financial institutions 
and their supervisory authorities; 
whereas banking secrecy must be 
1 i fted in crimina 1 cases; whereas a 
mandatory system of reporting sus-
p1c1ous transactions is the most 
effective way to accomplish such 
cooperation; whereas a special 
protection clause is necessary 
to exempt employees and directors 
from responsibility by breaching 
restrictions on disclosure of 
information; 
- 'serious crime' means a crime 
specified in Article 3 paragraph 1 
(a) and (c) of the Vienna 
Convention, terrorism and any other 
serious criminal offence (including 
in particular organized crime), 
whether or not connected with drugs, 
as defined by the Member States. 
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(Amendment No. 3) 
Thirteenth recital 
Whereas preserving the financial 
system from money 1 aunderi ng is a 
task which cannot be carried out by 
the judicial and law enforcement 
authorities without the cooperation 
of credit and financial institutions 
and their supervisory authorities; 
whereas banking secrecy must be 
1 i fted in crimina 1 cases; whereas a 
mandatory system of reporting sus-
PlClOUS transactions is the most 
effective way to accomplish such 
cooperation; whereas a special 
protection clause is necessary 
to exempt institutions, their 
employees and their directors from 
responsibility by breaching 
restrictions on disclosure of 
information; 
(Amendment No. 4) 
Thirteenth recital a (new) 
Whereas reporting to the authorities 
must be confined to inquiries 
concerning money laundering only; 
(Amendment No. 5) 
Fourteenth recital a (new) 
Whereas institutions failing to 
discharge the duties laid down in 
this Directive must be penalized by 
the supervisory authorities 
concerned; 
(Amendment No. 6) 
Article 1, fifth definition 
- 'serious crime' means a crime 
specified in Article 3 paragraph 1 
(a) and (c) of the Vienna 
Convention, terrorism, organized 
crime, illicit arms trading, 
counterfeiting, traffic in persons, 
the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others, 
and hostage taking, as 
the Member States. 
kidnapping 
defined by 
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Member States shall ensure that 
credit and financial institutions 
require identification of their 
customers when entering into business 
relations or conducting transactions, 
and in the case of doubt whether 
customers are acting on their own 
behalf, that these institutions take 
reasonable measures to establish the 
real identity of the persons on whose 
behalf a transaction is carried out 
or an account is opened. Credit and 
financial institutions shall keep 
records of the identity documents 
required until at least five years 
after relations with their clients 
have ended. 
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(Amendment No. 7) 
Article 1 • add new seventh 
definition 
-'international funds transfers' 
means any instruction given by a 
sender, or his agent, to a receiving 
natural or legal person, transmitted 
orally, electronically or in writing 
to pay or cause another natural or 
legal person to pay a fixed or 
determinable amount of money to a 
beneficiary, or to his agent, from 
one national jurisdiction to 
another, either within or outside 
the jurisdiction of the European 
Community. 
(Amendment No. 8) 
Article 3 
1. Member States shall ensure that 
credit and financial institutions 
require identification of their 
customers when entering into 
business relations or conducting 
transactions, and in the case of 
doubt whether customers are acting 
on their own behalf, that these 
institutions take reasonable 
measures to establish the real 
identity of the persons on whose 
behalf a transaction is carried out 
or an account is opened. 
2. Where credit and financial 
institutions act for other such 
institutions and it is impossible 
for the former to establish the 
identity of the persons on whose 
behalf the latter institutions are 
acting as principals, because of 
normal practice and the specific 
nature of the operations concerned, 
it shall be for the 1 atter to take 
reasonable steps to ascertain the 
real identity of the persons on 
whose behalf they are act~ 
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3. Credit and financial institutions 
shall keep records of the identity 
documents required until at least 
five years after relations with 
their clients have ended or until at 
1 east ten years thereafter in the 
case of intermittent transactions 
outside the scope of an 
uninterrupted contractual 
relationship. 
4. All natural and legal persons 
involved in effecting international 
funds transfers shall be required to 
maintain in electronic or paper form 
records of: 
~ the identity 
beneficiary of the funds 
of the 
transfer, 
the account number, if any, of the 
beneficiary and the identity of the 
agent, if any, acting on beha 1 f of 
the beneficiary and 
(ii) the identity of the sender of 
the funds transfer, the account 
number, if any, of the sender and 
the identity of the agent, if any, 
acting on behalf of the sender, 
for a period of at least five years. 
5. The European Commission and/or 
the competent national authorities 
may, in appropriate circumstances, 
order that natural and legal persons 
involved in international funds 
t ran fers should suspend such 
transfers to specified third 
countries. Such an order would be 
appropriate where, after monitoring 
t h e 1 e g a 1 s i t u a t i o n i n t h i rd 
countries, the European Commission 
and/or the competent national 
authorities conclude that the 
specified third country has failed 
to enact and/ or app 1 y adequate 
standards designed to eliminate 
money laundering and that it is 
satisfied as a result that the 
jurisdiction of the specified third 
country is regularly used for the 
purpose of money laundering. 
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Member States shall ensure that 
credit and financial institutions 
examine with special attention any 
unusual transaction not having an 
apparant economic or visible lawful 
purpose, and that such institutions 
refrain from entering into any 
transaction which they have reason 
to suspect may have any relation to 
money laundering. 
Member States shall ensure: 
1. That credit and financial 
institutions and their directors and 
employees cooperate fully with the 
relevant judicial or law enforcement 
authorities competent for criminal 
matters: 
- by informing these authorities, on 
their own initiative, of any facts 
they discover which could be related 
to a money laundering offence; 
- by furnishing these authorities 
witi, all information requested in the 
case of any criminal inquiry or 
rogatory commission on money 
laundering carried out according to 
the applicable legislation. 
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(Amendment No. 9) 
Article 4 
Member States shall ensure that all 
natural and legal persons, including 
credit and financial institutions, 
examine with special attention any 
unusual transaction and/or any 
transaction not having an apparant 
economic or vis i b 1 e 1 awful purpose, 
and that all such natural and legal 
persons should be under an 
obligation to report to the 
competent authorities the details of 
any transaction which they have 
reason to suspect may have any 
relation to money laundering. 
(Amendment No. 10) 
Article 4a (new) 
Any transaction or agreement 
prohibited pursuant to this 
Directive shall be automatically 
void. 
(Amendment No. 11) 
Article 5 
Member States shall ensure: 
1. That credit and financial 
institutions and their directors 
cooperate fully with the relevant 
judicial or law enforcement 
authorities competent for criminal 
matters: 
- by informing these authorities, on 
their own initiative, of any facts 
they discover which could be related 
to a money laundering offence; 
- by furnishing these authorities 
with all information requested in 
the case of any criminal inquiry or 
rogatory commission on money 
laundering carried out according to 
the applicable legislation. 
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2. That the disclosure in good faith 
to the relevant judicial or law 
enforcement authorities competent 
for criminal matters by any employee 
or director of a credit or financial 
institution of any suspicion or 
belief that an operation is aimed at 
or connected to money laundering, 
shall not constitute a breach of any 
restriction on disclosure of 
information imposed by contract or 
by any legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provision, and shall 
not involve for such employees and 
directors any civil or penal 
responsibility of any kind. 
Member States sha 11 ensure that if, 
in the course of inspections carried 
out in credit or financial 
institutions by the competent 
authorities, or in any other way, 
these authorities discover facts that 
could constitute evidence of money 
laundering, they inform the relevant 
judicial or law enforcement 
authorities competent for criminal 
matters. 
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2. That the disclosure in good faith 
to the relevant judicial or law 
enforcement authorities competent 
for criminal matters by any employee 
or director of a credit or financial 
institution of any suspicion or 
belief that an operation is aimed at 
or connected to money laundering, 
shall not constitute a breach of any 
restriction on disclosure of 
information imposed by contract or 
by any legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provision, and shall 
not involve for such employeesL 
directors or institutions any civil 
or penal responsibility of any kind. 
3. That, where injury is directly 
caused as a result of an inaccurate 
statement made in good faith, the 
State shall accept liability in 
respect of that injury. 
4. That information supplied to the 
authorities in accordance with 
paragraph 1 may be used only in 
connection with preliminary judicial 
inquiries into serious crimes within 
the meaning of this Directive. 
(Amendment No. 12} 
Article 6 
Member States shall ensure that if, 
in the course of inspections carried 
out in credit or financial 
i nst i tut ions by the competent 
authorities, or in any other way, 
these authorities discover facts 
that could constitute evidence of 
money laundering, they inform the 
relevant judicial or law enforcement 
authorities competent for criminal 
matters. Member States shall further 
ensure that the supervisory 
authorities pro vi de each other with 
the information relevant to them. 
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Member States shall ensure: 
2. That credit and financial 
institutions take the appropriate 
measures so that their employees are 
aware of the provisions contained in 
this Directive, and that they also 
establish special training 
programmes for their employees, to 
help them detect operations which 
may be related with money laundering 
as well as to instruct them as to 
how to proceed in such cases. 
Member States shall extend the 
provisions of this Directive, where 
applicable, to professions and 
undertakings, other than credit and 
financial institutions, which because 
of their involvement with cash 
transaction business, may be 
particularly susceptible to being 
used for money laundering purposes. 
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{Amendment No. 13) 
Article 7{2) 
Member States shall ensure: 
2. That credit and financial 
institutions take the appropriate 
measures so that their employees are 
aware of the provisions contained in 
this Directive, including 
participating in special training 
programmes for their employees, to 
help them detect operations which 
may be related with money laundering 
as well as to instruct them as to 
how to proceed in such cases. 
(Amendment No. 14) 
Article 8 
Deleted 
(Amendment No. 15) 
Article 8a (new) 
The competent authorities designated 
by the Member States shall apply 
administrative penalties to 
institutions failing to discharge 
the duties laid down in this 
Directive. 
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(Amendment No. 16) 
Article 8b (new) 
1. Member States shall ensure that 
proceeds from serious crime or 
property obtained by means of these 
proceeds shall be subject to 
confiscation. 
2. Member States shall ensure the 
availability of necessary provisio-
nal measures, such as freezing or 
seizing, to prevent any dealing in, 
transfer or disposal of property 
which, at a later stage, may be sub-
ject of a request for confiscation. 
(Amendment No. 17) 
Article 9a (new) 
The Commission shall, one year after 
1 January 1992 and at three yearly 
intervals thereafter, draw up a 
report on the application of this 
Directive and submit it to the 
European Parliament and the Council. 
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DRAFT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament 
on the proposal from the Commission to the Council 
for a directive on prevention of use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the proposal from the Commission to the Council 
(COM (90) 106 final - SYN 254) 1 , 
having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Article 149(2) of the EEC 
Treaty (Doc. C3-0111/90), 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens' Rights and the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy (Doc. A3-0273/90), 
1. Approves the Commission proposal subject to Parliament's amendments and in 
accordance with the vote thereon; 
2. Calls on the Commission to amend its proposal accordingly pursuant to 
Article 149(3) of the EEC Treaty; 
3. Asks to be consulted again should the Council intend to make substantial 
modifications to the Commission proposal; 
4. Calls on the Council to incorporate Parliament's amendments in the common 
position that it adopts in accordance with Article 149(2)(a) of the EEC 
Treaty; 
5. Instructs its President to forward this opinion to the Council and 
Commission. 
1oJ No. c 106, 28.4.1990, p. 6 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. Introduction 
The Commission has introduced a proposal for a Council directive on the 
prevention of money laundering. This proposal comes 10 years after the 1980 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
measures against the transfer and safekeeping of funds of a criminal origin. 
More recently we have seen the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted on 19 December 
1988 in Vienna (the Vienna Convention}, the reports of the banking supervisory 
authorities of the Group of Ten, of the "International Financial Action Group" 
(GAFI or !FAG} and of the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC}. 
Laundering of proceeds from criminal activities is a national and 
international phenomenon, covering both small and large amounts of money. In 
fact the problem has always existed: a large number of criminal categories may 
be involved (e.g. all kinds of illicit trade, theft, robbery etc.}. This is 
especially the case for organised crime. 
Preventing the use of proceeds from these criminal activities could therefore 
be very advantageous in preventing crime. 
To prevent the use of proceeds from criminal activities, national and 
international measures are needed. These measures should not only be 
effective in combating crime but should not distort the normal circulation of 
money. 
2. Main items of the Commission proposal 
The Commission of the European Communities proposes the following measures: 
a. Criminalizing money laundering (Article 2} 
b. Identification of customers and beneficial owners (Article 3} 
c. Due diligence of credit and financial institution (Article 4} 
d. Cooperation between financial institutions and authorities (Articles 5} 
e. Cooperation between financial supervisors and authorities (Article 6} 
f. Procedures of internal control and training programs by financial 
institutions (Article 7} 
Member States must take the necessary measures by 1 January 1992 at the 
latest. The legal act proposed is a Council directive based on Article 57(2}, 
third sentence of the EEC-Treaty. Article 57 ( 2}, first and third sentences 
were used as a legal basis for the second banking directive (OJ No. L381, 
30.12.1989, p. 1} and are thus appropriate for this proposal, which guarantees 
equal conditions throughout the Community. An amendment has been proposed to 
add the first sentence to the proposed legal basis. The cooperation procedure 
follows from the proposed legal basis. 
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3. The extent of money laundering 
Estimates as to the amounts laundered vary between 120 and 500 billion dollars 
(the former considered to be the most realistic figure) per year have been 
mentioned for drug dealing in the industrialised world, an amount which, 
according to the United Nations, exceeds that of the international oil trade 
and comes close to the turnover in arms trading. It is also estimated that 
about 50 to 70% of proceeds from drug dealing could be made available for 
laundering and for investment in apparently otherwise legitimate business. 
Money laundering must be a profitable business: the owner of the proceeds 
cannot use the money in his own place or country and is willing to invest it 
elsewhere. The GAFI report mentions as a price for money laundering a 
percentage of 6-8% of the amounts laundered. 
The proposal from the Commission not only aims to combat the use of the profit 
from the production and sales of drugs, but also other serious crime as 
defined by the Member States. Thus the amounts involved will be substantually 
higher. The definition of serious crime, taken from Article 3, paragraph 1 (a) 
and (c) of the Vienna Convention, with the addition of terrorism and any 
other serious criminal offence (including in particular organised crime) is 
very specific with regard to drugs proceeds, but very vague in connection with 
other crime. This should be more specific, with the further addition of 
kidnapping and the illegal arms trade, robbery and extortion. 
4. Relation between the proposal for a directive and other initiatives 
The Recommendation (No. R(80)10) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on measures against the transfer and safekeeping of funds of 
criminal origin has not resulted in all Member States of the Council of Europe 
adopting the 1 egi slat ion against money 1 aunderi ng. Of the EC Member States 
only France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have adopted specific 
legislation in respect of money laundering. Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy are preparing such legislation. The Recommendation itself 
dates from 1980 and is relatively simple. It asks for identity checks, 
cooperation and checks on banknotes used in connection with criminal offences. 
The Vienna Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, of 19 December 1988, has still to be ratified. It is 
very detailed and covers, for example, the problem of jurisdiction, 
confiscation, extradiction, mutual legal assistance, transfer of proceedings, 
cooperation and training, illicit traffic and free trade zones. The definition 
of serious crime which is used in the draft directive refers to the 
definitions in this Convention. 
The draft Convention elaborated by the Council of Europe's Select Committee of 
Experts on International cooperation in respect of search, seizure and 
confiscation of proceeds from crime contains 48 articles on the subject. The 
Commission proposal does not include measures to allow confiscation, which 
aspect will be dealt with later. 
The GAFI Recommendations aim at: 1. the identification of clients and 
conservation of documents; 2. increased diligence on the part of financial 
institutions to give special attention to all complex unusual and important 
transactions; immediately make known their suspicions to the competent 
authorities; establish means of fighting against laundering capitaL 
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especially by internal controls; 3. asking banks to implement recommendations 
of the !FAG to branches and foreign subsidiaries; 4. checking physical 
transport of funds to borders without restricting the freedom of capita 1 
movement within the Community; 5. establishing a system by which the banks 
would send to a central national bank all transactions above a certain amount; 
6. reducing cash settlement. 
These initiatives, which set out to deprive people engaged in crime of the 
proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby to eliminate their main 
incentive, are more detailed in their definitions and directed to more 
countries than the draft directive. 
It could seem 
draft Counci 1 
superfluous. 
that, given the existence of the Vienna Convention and the 
of Europe Convention, the draft directive might be thought 
However this is not so for three reasons: 
a. not all Member States currently have legislation on money laundering; 
b. it is necessary to avoid the distortion of competition between the banking 
sectors of the Member States (every measure concerning the surveillance of 
money laundering constitutes an administrative burden, which should be shared 
equally by all banks); 
c. it marks the European Community's determination to maintain free movement 
of capital and freedom to supply financial services, while preventing money 
launderers from taking undue advantage of weaknesses in the legislation in one 
or more Member State. 
Attention should be drawn to the fact that there are a number of groups 
working on pol ice cooperation (TREVI), the fight against drug addiction and 
the production, distribution and illegal trade in narcotics (High-level 
Coordinators' Group or CELAD), all reporting to the Council, in which the 
Commission sometimes takes part, but which never report to the European 
Parliament. It seems necessary that at least the Commission informs the 
Parliament about the negotiations, thus providing the information on which the 
Parliament can take action, if this should prove necessary. 
4. Description of money laundering 
The Commission defines money laundering as: 
the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from serious crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the 
illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved 
in committing such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences 
of his action, and 
the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, 
knowing that such property is derived from serious crime. 
A simple transaction involving money laundering consists of: payment into a 
bank account at a bank near where the crime was committed ("the placement"), 
then a transfer of the money to another bank and fi na 11 y use of the money 
("integration") at a place where the perpetrator of the crime cannot be 
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distinguished from other people, and where the source of his wealth is not 
known, thus providing an "honest appearance". 
Money can, for example, 
attention. There may also 
institutions with examples 
present to the authorities. 
be devided in small sums that do not attract 
be active cooperation within credit and financial 
within banks of false documents being created to 
It should be noted that there are more complex methods of placement, the 
ensuing "modification" and integration. In fact, a large number of 
transactions are used to efface any connection between placement and 
integration. The Annex to the GAFI-report analyses 34 different money 
laundering procedures for placement, the ensuing "modification" of the nature 
of the fund, and integration. One method by which this can be achieved 
involves switching funds in other curencies through money braking firms, so 
that the proceeds can be invested in other currencies without any trace of 
their illegal origin. 
However, the imagination of money launderers goes still further: the profits 
can be invested for example in a property investment company in the State 
where the profit is made, which can then in turn invest in property in other 
countries. The buying and selling of shares combined with their transfer to 
other States, false international loan agreements, physical export of gold or 
other commodities may also occur. One of the most difficult money laundering 
procedures to detect consists in a combination of legal importing and 
exporting of a variety of goods: in this way the proceeds can be exported 
and the profits of serious crime will seem to be profits of a profitable 
international import-export company. 
These examples show that the definition proposed by the Commission (which is 
the same definition used in Article 6, paragraph 1, a and b of the draft 
Convention of the Select Committee of the Council of Europe) covers the money 
laundering process itself, but it must be said that its detection in its 
different manifestations will be very difficult. The secrecy and complexity 
of transactions require frequently the cooperation of lawyers and accountants. 
Further, unofficial financial institutions such as money braking firms, 
investment companies and so on have in some cases cooperated in the past with 
money 1 aunderi ng businesses. Although Article 2 makes money 1 aunderi ng a 
criminal offence for all people and bodies involved, this does not seem 
sufficient. 
5. What does the Commission propose in the event of suspected money-
laundering transactions? 
The Commission proposes that: 
(a) money laundering shall be treated as a criminal offence (Article 2) 
(b) credit and financial institutions must refrain from carrying out such a 
transaction (Article 4) 
(c) the authorities have to be informed (Article 5). 
The proposed directive is silent on confiscation and on provisional measures. 
It is proposed that all Member States should be obliged to take such measures, 
s i nee they constitute a serious deterrent both to those who commit serious 
offences and to those who "launder" the proceeds of crime. It is particularly 
DOC_EN\RR\98402 - 16 - PE 141.357/fin. 
Or. EN 
these aspects of confiscation and criminal liability, which will lead to equal 
competitive conditions between banks in all Member States. 
6. Conclusions 
1. It is recommended to approve the draft directive subject to the amendments 
proposed. 
2. The European Parliament must be informed about the activities of all the 
working groups in the field of drugs and money laundering, in which the 
Commission participates and which report to the Council. 
3. Since the directive gives considerable scope to the Member States in 
respect of its implementation, it is necessary that the European Parliament 
be kept informed about the implementation and operation of the directive 
(cf. Amendment No. 17). 
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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy 
for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 
Draftsman: Mr de DONNEA 
At its meeting of 18 June 1990 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy appointed Mr de DONNEA draftsman. 
At its meetings of 19-21 September 1990, 15/16 October 1990 and 29/30 October 
1990 it considered the draft opinion. At the last meeting it adopted the 
conclusions. 
The following took part in the vote: Beumer, Chairman; Desmond, vice-chairman; 
de Montesquiou, vice-chairman; Fuchs, vice-chairman; de Donnea, draftsman; 
Barton, Beazley, Bofill Abeilhe, Cassidy, Colom i Naval, Cravinho, Donnelly, 
Ernst de la Graete, Herman, Hoff, Lulling, Metten, Patterson, Pinxten, Read, 
Roumeliotis, Seal, Siso Cruellas, Speciale, von Wogau and Cooney (for 
Gallenzi), Falconer (for Christiansen), Martinez (for Megret), Porto (for 
Visenti~ and Turner (for Stevens pursuant to Rule 111(2)). 
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The proposal for a directive is one of a series of measures taken at 
international (United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs, adopted in Vienna on 19 December 1988; Council of Europe 
Recommendation of 27 June 1980; Financial Action Task Force against Money 
Laundering established in July 1989 at the G7 Summit in Paris) and at 
national level to combat the laundering of the proceeds of crime. 
Money laundering can mainly be combated by means of the criminal law and via 
international cooperation among judicial and law enforcement authorities. 
However, this is not the sole strategy. Thus, the proposal covers the 
preventive role to be played by the financial system in the combating of money 
laundering, particularly as such activities may undermine the soundness, 
stability and prestige of the financial system as a whole. Finally, were the 
Community to take no action against money laundering, Member States might 
adopt measures incompatible with the completion of the single market. 
I. SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL 
1. Scope of the directive 
The proposal covers not only banks but all types of credit and financial 
institution, including insurance companies. In addition, Member States 
will be able to extend the scope of the directive to cover professions 
and undertakings other than credit institutions likely to be used for 
money-laundering purposes, e.g. casinos and exchange brokers. 
The definition of money laundering corresponds to that laid down in the 
Vienna Convention. It covers the laundering of the proceeds of criminal 
offences connected with drug trafficking, terrorism and all other serious 
crimes. 
The criminalization of money laundering by the Member States (Article 2) 
is a prerequisite for cooperation between financial institutions and 
judicial and law enforcement authorities. In most Member States, banking 
secrecy is lifted in connection with criminal offences. 
2. Means of preventing and combating money laundering 
(a) The obligation to identify customers 
The first measure set out in the directive concerns the 
identification of customers. Article 3 stipulates that financial 
institutions shall require their customers to give proof of identity 
and, in cases of doubt, shall take 'reasonable measures' to establish 
the real identity of the persons on whose behalf a transaction is 
carried out. These institutions are required to keep records of 
customers' identity documents for at least five years after relations 
with them have ended. 
(b) Cooperation with the judicial and law enforcement authorities 
This cooperation essentially requires financial institutions to: 
inform the competent authorities of any fact they discover which 
might be connected with money-laundering; 
provide these authorities with all the information requested. 
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With a view to facilitating this cooperation, financial institutions 
are to establish internal control procedures to detect money-
laundering operations and introduce special training programmes for 
their employees, who are to be given guarantees that the disclosure 
in good faith to the judicial authorities of transactions connected 
with money laundering will not entail any civil or criminal liability 
for them. 
The directive should come into force on 1 January 1992. 
II. ASSESSMENT 
1. The need to mobilize the financial system 
According to the various calculation methods employed (on the basis of 
world production, drug addicts' needs or the volume of drugs seized), 
sales of illegal drugs could amount to US$ 122 billion per year in the 
United States and Europe, of which US$ 85 bn per year could be available 
for laundering. 
These very considerable sums are laundered through complex circuits 
(investment with credit institutions; conversion into different forms of 
assets, reinjection into the economy). However, it is the investment of 
sums held in cash which is the weakest link in the money-1 aunderi ng 
chain. At this stage, it is still possible to detect the illegal nature 
of the operation. Subsequently, it becomes more and more difficult to 
unravel the complicated series of conversions through which the sums 
concerned have passed, particularly due to the speed of electronic 
capital transfers, the use of false documents and front companies. 
Given the damage caused by drugs and the banking risks, there is a need 
to mobilize the entire financial system to aid the law enforcement 
authorities in the fight against money laundering. 
2. Improving the mechanism 
The mechanism set out in the proposal for a directive should be improved 
in various respects in order to make it as effective as possible. The 
cost of its introduction and the constraints which it imposes on 
financial institutions can be justified only if it represents a credible 
deterrent. 
Legal basis 
The proposal for a directive deals with the operating conditions of 
financial institutions, and is therefore based on Article 57(2} of the 
EEC Treaty. 
However, the proposal for a directive also seeks to approximate the laws 
of the Member States in the sphere of criminal law and procedure. 
Under the terms of the proposal, Member States will be required to 
incorporate into national law the definition of a criminal offence 
(Article 2) and an obligation, under criminal procedure, to inform the 
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authorities of any facts which could constitute evidence of this 
offence. 
The legal basis should therefore also refer to Article 100a which deals 
with the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the 
establishment and the operation of the single market and, in particular, 
the free movement of capital. 
Scope 
A prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the mechanism covering the 
identification of customers and cooperation between the authorities and 
banks is the recognition by all the Member States of a common definition 
of money laundering. This uniform criminal i zat ion is the key to the 
mechanism. 
In this connection, the concept of a 'serious crime' (Articles 1 and 2} 
is not sufficiently precise. Differences in interpretation from one 
country to another would be i ncompat i bl e with the notion of a single 
market. Given the difficulty of establishing a precise definition of 
serious crime, one solution would be to refer to the crimes defined in 
the international conventions and agreements listed in the annex to the 
proposal for a directive. By the same token, the system will function 
effectively only if all the Member States agree to lift banking secrecy 
when the serious crimes in question are detected. Finally, so that 
laundered money cannot benefit from the facilities offered by financial 
agents or institutions other than those defined in Article 1, the Member 
States must make the provisions of the directive binding, by adapting 
them if necessary, on all professions and undertakings other than credit 
and financial institutions (Article 8} which act as financial brokers, 
introducing arrangements tailored to each of these professions. 
The identification of customers and dubious transactions 
Without compelling financial institutions to carry out policing 
activities for which they have no legal powers, they must be placed under 
a strict obligation to exercise vigilance with regard to the real 
identity of customers, the apparent economic purpose of transactions and 
their unusual nature and when the institution receiving or forwarding the 
money is located in a country with no, or only primitive, mechanisms for 
combating money laundering. 
However, the current wording of Article 3 may pose insoluble problems 
for clearing systems such as Euro-Clear, Cedel and Swift. It is quite 
impossible for the manager of such systems to identify the persons on 
whose behalf operations are being carried out. The financial broker 
affiliated to the clearing system himself acts on behalf of customers 
whose identity he does not have to reveal to the clearing system. In 
this instance, it is clearly incumbent on the financial broker 
affiliated to the clearing system to meet the requirements laid down in 
Article 3 of the proposal for a directive. 
This is all the more necessary because, given the extraordinarily high 
volume of securities on deposit and transactions carried out in a 
clearing system, it would not be feasible for such a system to determine 
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and keep a record of the identity of the persons on whose behalf 
transactions are carried out or securities or cash are held. 
Penalties 
The mechanism laid down by the directive could also be strengthened if 
more precise penalties were imposed for financial institutions which fail 
to comply with the requirements. The lack of precise penalties will not 
only make the mechanism less effective but will also distort competition 
between more and less scrupulous institutions. 
Liability 
The provision exempting employees or directors from civil or criminal 
liability if they inform the authorities in good faith of their suspicion 
of money 1 aunderi ng should be extended to cover the i nst i tut ion i tse 1 f 
(legal person). 
In addition, any individual suffering serious injury as a result of a 
false declaration made in good or bad faith should receive compensation 
from the state in accordance with arrangements to be laid down 2 . 
Finally, statements made to the authorities under the terms of Article 
5(1) should be used only for inquiries concerning money laundering. 
Other measures 
Member States should ratify the Vienna Convention of 20 December 1988 and 
implement the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
against Money Laundering established in July 1989 at the G7 Summit in 
Pari s3 • 
2 
3 
Article 6 of the bill passed by the French National Assembly 
stipulates that in the event of an injury resulting directly from 
such a statement, the state wi 11 compensate the damage suffered. 
Provision might also be made for the institutions covered by this 
directive to make contributions to a fund constituted for this same 
purpose. 
Report submitted to the governments in February 1990 
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AMENDMENTS 
Commission text Amendments 
Amendment No. 1 
Thirteenth recital, fourth clause 
... , whereas a special protection 
clause is necessary to exempt 
employees and directors from 
responsibility by breaching 
restrictions on disclosure of 
information; 
... , whereas a special protection 
clause is necessary to exempt 
institutions, their employees and 
their directors from responsibility 
by breaching restrictions on 
disclosure of information; whereas 
victims of false disclosures must be 
compensated for the injury suffered; 
Amendment No. 2 
Recital 13a (new} 
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Whereas statements made to the 
authorities must be used on 1 y for 
inquiries dealing solely with money 
laundering; 
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Amendment No. 3 
Recital 14a (new) 
Whereas failure by the institutions 
concerned to meet the requirements 
laid down in this Directive must be 
subject to the penalties imposed by 
their supervisory authorities; 
Amendment No. 4 
Article 3 
Member States shall ensure that 
credit and financial institutions 
require identification of their 
customers when entering into business 
relations or conducting transactions, 
and in the case of doubt whether 
customers are acting on their own 
behalf, that these institutions take 
reasonable measures to establish the 
real identity of the persons on whose 
beha 1 f a transaction is carried out 
or an account is opened. Credit and 
financial institutions shall keep 
records of the identity documents 
required until at least five years 
after relations with their clients 
have ended. 
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Member States shall ensure that 
credit and financial institutions 
are required to establish the 
identity of their customers when 
entering into business relations or 
conducting transactions, and in the 
case of doubt whether customers are 
acting on their own behalf, that 
these institutions take reasonable 
measures to establish the real 
identity of the persons on whose 
behalf a transaction is carried out 
or an account is opened. Credit and 
financial institutions shall keep 
records of the identity documents 
required until at least five years 
after relations with their clients 
have ended. Where credit and 
financial i nst itut ions act by order 
of other similar institutions and it 
is impossible for them, by virtue 
of the practices or features 
peculiar to the transactions to 
establish the identity of the 
persons on whose behalf the 
principal institutions are acting, 
it sha 11 be incumbent on the 1 atter 
to take reasonable measures to 
establish the real identity of the 
persons on whose behalf they are 
acting. Credit and financial 
institutions shall keep records of 
the identity documents required 
until at least five years after 
relations with their clients have 
ended. 
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Amendment No. 5 
Article 5 
Member States shall ensure: 
1. That credit and financial 
institutions and their directors and 
employees cooperate fully with the 
relevant judicial or law enforcement 
authorities competent for criminal 
matters: 
2. 
by informing these authorities, 
on their own initiative, of any 
facts they discover which could 
be related to a money laundering 
offence; 
by furnishing these authorities 
with all information requested 
in the case of any criminal 
inquiry or rogatory commission 
on money laundering carried out 
according to the applicable 
legislation. 
That the disclosure in good 
faith to the relevant judicial 
or law enforcement authorities 
competent for criminal matters 
by any employee or director of a 
credit or financial institution 
of any suspicion or belief that 
an operation is aimed at or 
connected to money 1 aunderi ng, 
shall not constitute a breach of 
any restriction on disclosure of 
information imposed by contract 
or by any legislative, 
regulatory or administrative 
provision, and shall not involve 
for such employees and directors 
any civil or penal 
responsibility of any kind. 
DOC EN\RR\98402 - 25 -
Member States shall ensure: 
1. Unchanged. 
2. That the disclosure in good 
faith to the relevant judicial 
or law enforcement authorities 
competent for criminal matters 
by any employee or director of 
a credit or financial 
institution of any suspicion 
or belief that an operation is 
aimed at or connected to money 
laundering, shall not 
constitute a breach of any 
restriction on disclosure of 
information imposed by 
contract or by any 
legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provision, and 
shall not involve for such 
employees and directors or the 
institution concerned any 
civil or penal responsibility 
of any kind. 
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3. In the event of injury resulting 
from a false declaration made in 
good faith, the state shall 
compensate the victim. 
4. Information passed on to the 
authorities pursuant to paragraph 1 
may be used only in investigations 
relating to the serious crimes 
referred to in this directive. 
Amendment No. 6 
Article 8 
Member States shall extend the 
provisions of this Directive, where 
applicable, to professions and 
undertakings, other than credit and 
financial institutions, which because 
of their involvement with cash 
transaction business may be 
particularly susceptible to being 
used for money laundering purposes. 
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Member States shall extend the 
provisions of this Directive, 
adapting them where necessary to 
professions and undertakings, other 
than credit and financial 
institutions, which because of their 
involvement with cash transaction 
business may be particularly 
susceptible to being used for money 
laundering purposes. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. The laundering of the proceeds of crime has a decisive bearing on the 
spread of organized crime in general and drug trafficking in particular. 
The Community must therefore take all the measures required to contribute 
effectively to the fight against this form of crime. 
2. In addition to the moral imperatives of public safety and health, 
Community intervention is necessitated by the fact that the 
liberalization of capital movements and the freedom to provide financial 
services could facilitate money-laundering activities. 
3. Pen a 1 procedures must therefore be accompanied 
for cooperation with financial institutions. 
preclude the adoption of national measures 
completion of the internal market. 
by a Community strategy 
This coordination will 
incompatible with the 
4. The mechanism set out in the proposal for a directive incorporates, for 
this purpose, a requirement to identify clients and to exercise vigilance 
as to the objective of transactions, along with arrangements for close 
cooperation with the judicial and law enforcement authorities. 
5. However, in order to respond as effectively as possible to the 
recommendations made by the various international bodies concerned, this 
mechanism should be strengthened or clarified. In this connection: 
the lifting of banking secrecy in connection with the serious crimes 
covered by this directive should be guaranteed in all Member States 
in accordance with standard arrangements; 
the directive should necessarily cover all institutions, professions 
and undertakings whose activities include cash transactions open to 
exploitation by money launderers, the provisions to be adapted if 
necessary; 
failures on the part of financial institutions to meet the 
requirement to exercise vigilance should be the subject of 
administrative penalties imposed by the supervisory authorities; 
otherwise, the introduction of the mechanism may cause distortions of 
competition to the benefit of less scrupulous institutions; 
the state must compensate victims of false statements for any injury 
suffered; 
statements made to the authorities under the terms of Article 5 may 
be used only for inquiries in connection with money laundering. 
6. In more general terms, the mechanism will be effective only if the Member 
States: 
ratify the Vienna Convention of 20 December 1988; 
implement the conclusions recently arrived at by the Financial Action 
Task Force against Money Laundering, which advocated, in particular, 
the confiscation of 1 aundered assets, centra 1 i zed records, and the 
DOC_EN\RR\98402 - 27 - PE 141.357/fin. 
Or. EN 
development of modern and safe fund management techniques (increased 
use of cheques, charge cards and the automated recording of 
transactions involving securities). 
7. The proposal for a directive should be approved subject to the preceding 
amendments and remarks which the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' 
Rights is asked to take into account. 
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